Richard Holden

• "The Original Management Incentive Schemes", Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(4), Fall 2005, 135-144. (Copyright, 2005, American Economic Association)
• "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack But Never Crack", (with John Friedman), American Economic Review 98(1), March 2008, 113-144. (Copyright, 2008, American Economic Association)
• "The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?", (with John Friedman), Journal of Politics, April 2009, 593-613. (Copyright, 2009, Southern Political Science Association)
• "The Nature of Tournaments" (with Robert Akerlof). Economic Theory. Forthcoming
• "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?" (with Phlippe Aghion). Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(2), Spring 2011, 181-197 (Copyright, 2011, American Economic Association)
• "Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem" (with Rosalind Dixon), in Comparative Constitutional Design (Tom Ginsburg ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming
• "Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans" (with Roland Fryer). Journal of Law and Economics. Forthcoming
• "Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering" (with Adam Cox). University of Chicago Law Review. Forthcoming
• "Power or Neutrality" (with John Ferejohn and Tom Ginsburg). Forthcoming

Working papers and papers under review

• Government Signals (with Anup Malani)
• Optimal Primaries (with Patrick Hummel)
• Subgame-Perfect Implementation under Value Perturbations and the Hold-Up Problem (with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Takashi Kunimoto and Olivier Tercieux)
• Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules--To Scale (with Rosalind Dixon)
• Supermajority Voting Rules
• Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited (with Robert Gibbons and Michael Powell)
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Goods Markets (with Robert Gibbons and Michael Powell)
• Optimal Gerrymandering in a Competitive Environment (with John Friedman)
• Comparative Statics in Principal-Agent Problems
• This consolidates and expands on papers previously circulated under the titles: "A Monotonicity Based Approach for Analyzing Principal-Agent Problems", "Holmstrom's Sufficient Statistic Theorem", and "The Value of Information in Principal-Agent Problems"
• Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision (with Florian Ederer and Margaret Meyer)
• A Theory of Rule Development (with Glenn Ellison)
• Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections (with Alberto Alesina)
• Incentive Compatibility: Everywhere vs. Almost Everywhere (with Murali Agastya)
• Managerial Contracts at Regulated Firms (with Christine Jolls)
• Does Competition Make Firms More Efficient?
• Boesky Insider Traders (with Murali Agastya)

Book reviews

• "The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies" by Sanjai Bhagat and Richard H. Jeffries, Jr. Economic Record, March 2003

Popular articles

• "Bushfire toll shows need for compulsory home cover," Sydney Morning Herald ("SMH") 4 February, 2003
• "Bad Medicine for Ailing Health System," SMH 14 April, 2003
• "Assistance to industry needs new strategies," Australian Financial Review ("AFR") 3 March, 2004
• "The Residential Property Market and the Witches From The Scottish Play," The Analyst, December 2005
• "The Gerrymandering Myth," The New Republic (Digital), 1 June, 2006
• "Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections," Vox, September, 2008

• Contract Theory
• Organizational Economics
• Political Economy
• Law and Economics